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Consider the plight of the Moldovans. The people of this poor country in
Eastern Europe has a very big problem shared by others: a Russian army
that will not go home. And it’s no wonder the army wants to stay: by
Moscow standards, Moldova
has a forgiving climate and ample supplies of decent wine. In Soviet
days, the Moscow apparatchiks took frequent junkets to what was then
known as the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.
When the Cold War ended and the newly freed states of Eastern Europe evicted their former, undesirable brothers-in-law of the revolution, civil wars broke out in places where Russification had been most egregious. These were obscure districts such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, and Abkhazia. Along the northern bank of the Dniester River, the industrial heartland of Soviet Moldova, many of Moscow's faithful had settled. When Moldova broke free in 1991, this fifth column responded with a declaration of autonomy as the country of Transdniestria.
Tensions escalated to hostilities in December of 1991 and again in 1992. The local Russian army garrison doubtless armed their separatist accomplices to fight the meager Moldovan Army defending their nascent sovereignty. The war was short, ending with formal intervention by the Russian 14th Army Group. Moldovan leaders recognized the influence of the Russian forces on the separatists, and both responded to Moscow's wishes.
Seven years later, the Agreement on Adaptation — intended to adapt the
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) to post-Cold War Europe —
was signed at the Istanbul OSCE Summit, but only after Russia pledged
the “orderly and complete” withdrawal of its forces from all of Moldova, including Transdniestria. But to this day, the Russians remain.
Under Russian protection, the Transdniestrian accomplices are
provocative and obstructionist. Snipers fire at Moldovan border guards
and even seized a Moldovan border post. Transdniestrian thugs closed
schools that teach the Latin-script (Western) alphabet instead of
Cyrillic (Russian), forcing children to sleep on the ground and
temporarily arresting teachers. The list of outrages is extensive. This
de facto autonomous region, protected by Russian “peacekeepers,” is run
by what amounts to a mafia that oversees various criminal enterprises,
to the satisfaction of their Russian benefactors. To their credit, the
Russians stage well-scripted Potemkin attempts to pullout. Buses full
of elderly women and kids arrive and populate the railroad tracks to
block departing trains. So we are left to believe that the army that
marched from Stalingrad to Berlin can’t leave Moldova on any day it
chooses.
The predicament of Moldova is emblematic of the
current Russian geopolitical intent. Since the signing of the Istanbul
Agreement, a yearning has developed in Moscow to revive a greater
Russia, to recapture the greatness of the Soviet Era where Russia was a
reviled but acknowledged world player. Throughout the 1990s, beyond a
vast and potentially uncontrolled nuclear arsenal, was there anything
besides oil that made Russia relevant to the world? The tragic and
seemingly unending embarrassment known as Chechnya has compounded
damage to the façade of Russian greatness.
During the 1990s,
Russian nationalism’s primary soothsayer was the unapologetically
retro-imperial Vladimir Zhurinovsky. His unrestrained bravado in
concert with a rapid growth in popularity sent tremors through the
West. But the real driver of new Russia has been Vladimir Putin, an
ex-secret police officer of formidable intellect and substantial
political patronage. He became the real standard bearer of Russian
nationalism as a dignified and restrained voice for the dispossessed
and the nostalgic.
After eight years of an undeniably successful presidency, Putin gave his final address
to Russia on April 26. Among his many distortions, he warned of NATO as
a threat to Russia, justifying suspension of Russia’s CFE Treaty
obligations. This would be a shocking development were it not for the
fact that Russia has been acting counter to the object and purpose of
the treaty for eight years. In its own way, President Putin’s
announcement makes the Russian position more honest, a fabricated
premise for a continued act of bad faith.
Russian desire to
influence its near abroad is best shown by the continuing row with
Estonia. A decision to move a Soviet-era statue from downtown Tallinn
provoked riots by ethnic Russians. Approximately 1.3 million ethnic
Russians live in Estonia, roughly half of whom are reported to actually
have citizenship. Russian lawmakers called immediately for the
suspension of diplomatic ties as demonstrators in Moscow attacked the
Estonian Consulate. This rigged display of Russian pride forced NATO to exhort
Russia to honor the Vienna convention, which stipulates that host
nations are obligated to protect foreign diplomatic facilities and
personnel.
In a speech commemorating the end of World War II
in Red Square last week, Putin hinted at Estonia’s removal of the
statue stating that such actions spread “enmity and new distrust between countries and peoples.” He went on to imply a linkage of the issue to American primacy with a warning, “These
new threats, just as under the Third Reich, show the same contempt for
human life and the same aspiration to establish an exclusive dictate
over the world.” This is a clear populist attempt to juxtapose America
with fascism in an effort to galvanize the will of Russians. Given the
depth of the scares from that war, such tones merit close monitoring.
Putin’s Russia is a creature in search of power, not justice. Much like
the early days of Nazi Germany where people were incited to nationalism
through entitlement, Putin’s message fabricates an agenda of grievances
against the West. For all of its miserable failings and depravity, the
Soviet monolith at least erected a façade by perverting patriotism and
creating a philosophy that appealed to some peoples higher hopes. As
Putin exits the stage to become Russia’s grand puppeteer, we wonder
what his injection of nationalism portends for the future of Russia.
For that matter, what about Russia’s neighbors and the rest of the
world?
Remember the Moldovans.
By Paul Janiczek
article.nationalreview.com
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